sum in question is taken just over the members of E instead of all worlds whatsoever: assuming that requirement (e.g. with Lewis 1981) has the natural consequence that general imaging of P on E (relative to T) will determine a probability measure that assigns probability 1 to E. Since this feature of updating on E will not play a role, however, for any of the arguments later in the paper, we will not take up this requirement here. 9 Since for fixed E and w', T E (w', w) gives rise to a probability measure T E, w' that is both evidencerelative and world-relative (by setting T E, w' (A) = ∑ w in A T E (w', w)), the result of imaging P on E relative to T can also be expressed in the following alternative manner,
in the last line of which P(A\\E) may be interpreted as a convex combination of these evidence&world-relative probabilities T E, w' (A) of A, or, if one likes to, as the "expected chance" of A is then called the result of general imaging of P on E (relative to the given transfer function T), and the mapping \\ T that sends a probability measure P and a non-empty proposition E to
P(⋅\\ T E) is the very update procedure of general imaging (relative to T). Clearly, given W,
any such update function \\ T is determined completely by its underlying transfer function T.
Since its introduction, general imaging has been applied and explored in different areas. In particular, Joyce (1999, chapters 5 and 6) suggests general imaging to express, in probabilistic terms, subjunctive or counter-to-the-facts supposition, just as conditionalization expresses supposition as a matter of fact. Accordingly, he uses general imaging as a means of making the tenets of Causal Decision Theory precise, much as conditionalization is employed in Evidential Decision Theory. More recently, Baratgin and Politzer (2011) defend the thesis that general imaging is a plausible description of actual human belief revision processes in dynamic environments, based on a series of empirical findings.
One of the crucial features of general imaging, if compared to conditionalization, is this:
10 what the fraction T E (w', w) (⋅ 100 percent) that a world w' transfers to a world w is like depends only on w', w, and E; in particular, it does not depend on the probability measure P that is to be updated. Whatever one's degree-of-belief function P may be, it is solely a matter of the evidence (that is, E) and the world(s) in question (that is, w', w) what fraction of the probabilistic mass that P supplies to w' will be moved to w.
This contrasts with conditionalization: if conditionalization is presented in a similarly additive format, that is,
the underlying transition function will have to be defined so that T E, P (w', w) = P({w}/E). In other words: T will also depend on P (while it will not actually depend on w' at all). 11 In the where the corresponding "chances" are determined by T E, w' (A) relative to worlds w' and the evidence E. We will return to this point later in this section. 10 This feature is emphasized, discussed, and ultimately criticized by Joyce (2010), pp.149f. 11 The same point is discussed by Pearl (1994), p.205.
case of conditionalization, each degree-of-belief function will thus determine its "own" corresponding transfer function, unlike the case of general imaging in which one and the same probability-independent transition function is used for all probability measures on W whatsoever.
For instance: the transfer function T that determines uniquely the corresponding general imaging function \\ T might be defined such that the set of worlds w for which T E (w', w)>0
holds coincides with the set of worlds in E that are most similar or close to w', and T E (w', w) might be chosen to be uniform over these worlds, in which case T would be determined solely by something like world-relative similarity orderings (along the lines of the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals). Or T E (w', w) might be identified with the conditional objective chance at w' of the proposition {w} given the proposition E, in which case T would be fully determined by worldly conditional chance measures. 12 Or T E (w', w) might be defined as the objective chance of ending up in w given that one acts in w' such that E becomes true (if that proposal differs at all from the conditional chance ascription in the previous case); 13 and so on. In each of these cases, T would be given in a manner that is independent of P, and the corresponding instance \\ T of general imaging would inherit this feature, unlike the case of conditionalization. If spelled out in terms of learning: while conditionalizing on the evidence corresponds to learning something new about the present state of the actual world (where each world w counts as a candidate of what the actual world might be like), general imaging \\ T corresponds to learning that the previously present state of the world (w') has changed, or has been changed by someone or something, into a new one (w), to an extent that is measured by
12 Compare footnote 8. This choice corresponds to Skyrms ' (1980a, 1980b, 1984 
leads to the same result as first linearly pooling the given individual degree-of-belief functions P i with respect to numbers α 1 ,…, α k , which gives
and then updating the so determined social probability measure P by general imaging:
That is, by Gärdenfors' theorem, it holds that
As promised initially, we have thus determined a natural mechanism of probabilistic update other than conditionalization that is not affected by the dilemma concerning group update that had been explained in the introductory section.
In the next section we will interpret this finding, we will at least partially determine a class of situations for which it will be highly relevant, and we will illustrate it by means of a concrete toy example.
Interpreting the Result and a Toy Example
What are the consequences of the formal result from the last section for rational group learning? Will subjects S 1 ,...,S k ever rationally employ general imaging so that Gärdenfors' theorem becomes applicable to them?
In the following, we will give a partial answer to these questions by focusing just on the (II)->(I) direction of the theorem from the last section. 16 If our subjects find themselves in a situation in which update by general imaging is the appropriate response to evidence, and indeed-what is more-update by general imaging with respect to a joint or socially shared transfer function T is the right response (in the sense that the transfer function that is underlying \\ as denoted in the k expressions 'P 1 (A\\E)',…, 'P k (A\\E)' from the last section is always one and the same), then the (II)->(I) direction will guarantee that linear pooling of the individual beliefs will not be subject to the initial concern regarding update; which is clearly a 16 The other direction (I)->(II) is interesting, too, but probably less salient: it expresses that if one and the same learning method is supposed to commute with linear pooling whatever the group of subjects and whatever the subjects' weights α 1 ,…, α k of social influence are like, then that learning method must coincide with an instance of general imaging that is determined by some fixed transfer function. So if a learning method is meant to be stable across groups and across changes in the social weights of the members of a group, and if linear pooling is the preferred method of aggregation, then general imaging is the only update scheme that is up for the job. So let us suppose that our k subjects do in fact learn that the state of the actual world has changed in a particular manner, so that updating by means of general imaging does seem to be the appropriate response. While being a first step into the right direction, if just taken by itself, this is still not quite what we are looking for: because, as explained before, we need to characterize a type of situation in which additionally our subjects' updating by general imaging ought to be given with respect to one and the same joint transfer function T. So when will that be plausibly the case?
Returning to our previous discussion of probability-independent transition functions, let us thus additionally assume T to express inferential commitments that reflect solely worldrelated knowledge (given the evidence) about, say, objective similarities between worlds, or conditional chances at worlds, or the chances of bringing about certain worlds (or states), or the like; then our group of subjects will apply imaging with respect to a joint such T, if, and only if, they rely on the same such information (whether implicitly or explicitly) concerning similarity or chances or the like when updating by general imaging. We might summarize what these types of information have in common in the following rough (and admittedly vague) terms: all of them derive from relevant bits of causal (and perhaps statistical) information that our subjects must share, where the reasons why they share them might be manifold: perhaps because they had all acquired the relevant bits of commonsense experience concerning causal and statistical relationships before (as would be sufficient for many everyday contexts); or because they had all been presented with the same set of causal data before (as would be the case, e.g., for jury members in a legal trial); or because before updating on the new piece of evidence they had already exchanged and discussed the relevant causal data on which their update would be based (as would be the case maybe in scientific panels of experts); and so on. Summing up: if a group of subjects finds itself in a situation that is characterized by
• The relevant evidence being about changes (of the state) of the actual world, in combination with
• the subjects sharing the relevant inferential dispositions that derive from sharing the same causal-statistical background knowledge on which their updates will be be based, then update by general imaging with respect to a shared transfer function T will seem to be the normatively right thing for them to do. And by the right-to-left direction of the theorem from the last section, general imaging with respect to such a joint transfer function will not be subject to the commutativity dilemma concerning group update with linear pooling.
Therefore, in circumstances as described above, the commutativity dilemma loses its bite, and 'group update' has indeed a unique referent. The claim is not at all that linear averaging and general imaging would be anything like the "universally valid" methods of aggregation and update. They are certainly more ideally targeted to some problems of belief aggregation and updating than others (e.g., they are more plausible in cases where several subjects are learning how the world is changing, rather than learning new information about how the world once was). The claim is merely that there exist problems to which it is reasonable to apply linear averaging and general imaging, and that in such cases the commutativity dilemma will not arise.
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Let me illustrate this now in terms of a very simple toy example 18 .
Say, we are dealing with two subjects S 1 , S 2 who have different information about the contents of a basket with fruit. Both of them can rule out all possibilities except for these three worlds (distributions of fruit in the basket):
w 1 , in which there are precisely one apple and one banana in the basket, w 2 , in which there is precisely one pear in the basket, w 3 , in which there is precisely one apple in the basket.
So all worlds other than these three have prior probability 0 according to both subjects.
However, S 1 , S 2 differ in terms of the degrees of belief that they assign to w 1 , w 2 , w 3 : S 1 's degree-of-belief function is such that P 1 ({w 1 }) = 1/6, P 1 ({w 2 }) = 2/3, P 1 ({w 3 }) = 1/6, which means that S 1 is pretty sure that there is just one pear in the basket and nothing else, while S 2 's degree-of-belief function satisfies P 2 ({w 1 }) = 1/3, P 2 ({w 2 }) = 1/3, P 2 ({w 3 }) = 1/3 and hence S 2 is completely impartial concerning the three possibilities.
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer and to an editor of this journal for very helpful comments on this point. 18 The example is similar to one discussed by Baratgin and Politzer (2011) , though some of the formal details differ.
Next we can determine the group belief for our two subjects as recommended by linear pooling. For that purpose, we need to choose the coefficients or weights that correspond to the subjects: let us assume that the two of them are peers with equal influence on the intended social outcome; so α 1 = 1/2, α 2 = 1/2. With that in place, we can determine the social probability measure P for S 1 and S 2 viewed as a group, which is given by for all propositions A: P(A) = α 1 P 1 (A) + α 2 P 2 (A), and in particular, P({w 1 }) = 1/12 + 1/6 = 1/12 + 2/12 = 3/12 = 1/4, P({w 2 }) = 2/6 + 1/6 = 3/6 = 1/2, P({w 3 }) = 1/12 + 1/6 = 1/12 + 2/12 = 3/12 = 1/4.
The outcome reflects S 1 's preference for w 2 , although the preference is weakened from 2/3 to 1/2 in view of S 2 's indifference.
Accordingly, for instance, the corresponding degrees of belief for there being an apple in the basket are: P 1 (apple in basket) = 1/3, P 2 (apple in basket) = 2/3, P(apple in basket) = 1/2.
So linear pooling makes it more likely for S 1 but less likely for S 2 that there is an apple in the basket.
Now let us assume that some new piece of evidence comes along: there is actually no banana
in the basket. How should the subjects update on this new available information qua group?
In line with our previous discussion, this depends on whether the evidence is meant to express some additional information about an unchanged world (the banana is not in the basket, i.e., it has not been there) or rather information about how the world has changed (the
banana is not in the basket, i.e., it was removed if it had been there at all).
And as explained before, we are going to analyze this in the way that two different kinds of update functions will be applied to one and the same piece of evidence, that is, to the proposition the banana is not in the basket (or the set {w 2 , w 3 } of worlds): in the first case standard Bayesian update on this proposition will be the rational response, while in the other case general imaging on the proposition will be called for.
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Let us consider the Bayesian option first: for instance, the new piece of evidence might have been communicated to S 1 and S 2 by someone whom they know to be precise, epistemically trustworthy, and uninterested in eating or stealing fruit; and there is no other reason either for thinking that anyone was causally interfering with the situation. Hence conditionalization seems to be the appropriate update mechanism.
(i) Conditionalizing first and linearly pooling afterwards leads to: Each of our two subjects updates individually on the evidence by means of conditionalization, which yields 19 It is an interesting question whether one might instead analyze the propositional evidence differently in the two cases and then apply the same update mechanism to the two corresponding distinct propositions, rather than applying two distinct update mechanisms to one and the same proposition. We cannot explore this any further here, but there would be at least two downsides to any such alternative analysis: It might be that semantically indeed the same message is delivered to the two subjects in the two situations and that it is only the pragmatic connotations of the respective acts of delivery that make it clear to them how they ought to react to the message; in which case applying two distinct update functions to the same proposition would seem to be the more appropriate reconstruction. And: the underlying space of possibilities would need to be much more sophisticated if the differences between the banana has not been there and the banana was removed if it had been there at all ought to be captured in terms of propositional content. In particular, as far as the proposition an apple is in the basket (the set {w 1 , w 3 }) is concerned, the outcome will be: which is less than the prior P(apple in basket) = α 1 P 1 (apple in basket) + α 2 P 2 (apple in basket) = 1/2. So this first kind of Bayesian group update disconfirms the thesis that the apple is in the basket.
On the other hand, (ii) first applying linear pooling and then conditionalizing leads to: as the group probability measure P has been determined above already, it only remains to update P by conditionalizing it on the evidence, which yields P(apple in basket / banana not in basket [i.e., it has not been there]) = 1/3, which is also less than the prior P(apple in basket) = α 1 P 1 (apple in basket) + α 2 P 2 (apple in basket) = 1/2. However, 1/3 is distinct from the 7/20 that had been calculated in (i). As expected, conditionalization and linear pooling do not commute:
and it is not clear anymore whether 'Bayesian group update' ought to refer to (i) or (ii) (if to either of them at all). Now let us turn to the other type of situation: for instance, the new piece of evidence might have been communicated to S 1 and S 2 by someone whom they know to be precise, epistemically trustworthy, but also highly interested in eating banana. They interpret this person's message therefore as conveying that the person would have removed the banana from the fruit basket had it been there initially. So they ought to apply general imaging instead of conditionalization (or so I am going to assume).
Based on their shared everyday knowledge of causal relationships-as in: taking the banana out of a fruit basket does not change the basket and its contents except for the banana being gone-the underlying transfer function T will be one and the same for both subjects: in particular, if 'E' denotes the proposition the banana is not in the basket [i.e., it was removed if it had been there at all], then T E (w 1 , w 1 ) = 0, T E (w 1 , w 2 ) = 0, and T E (w 1 , w 3 ) = 1, since removing the banana from the basket will change w 1 into w 3 , whilst T E (w 2 , w 1 ) = 0, T E (w 2 , w 2 ) = 1, T E (w 2 , w 3 ) = 0, T E (w 3 , w 1 ) = 0, T E (w 3 , w 2 ) = 0, T E (w 3 , w 3 ) = 1, as there had not been any banana in the basket at either of w 2 and w 3 in the first place. Because the values of T E are crisp, it is clear that we will be dealing with a case of imaging simpliciter here instead of general imaging proper. For instance, in more complex circumstances, grabbing the banana from the basket might come just with a high chance of succeeding in its removal (say, T E (w 1 , w 3 ) = 0.9) so that failing to remove the banana from the basket could not be ruled out completely (T E (w 1 , w 1 ) = 0.1), in which case plain imaging would not be sufficient anymore.
However, for the sake of simplicity, let us stick to the binary T E values from before.
Let \\ (or, if we like to, \) be the update by (generalized) imaging that is given by T, where we will only be interested in the context in which the proposition the banana is not in the basket is the relevant piece of evidence.
(iii) First applying imaging and only then linear pooling leads to: Each of our two subjects updates individually on the evidence by means of imaging, which yields (by "moving"
probabilities from w 1 to w 3 ) Linear pooling of these individual probability measures after imaging gives then: there at all) = 1/6 + 2/6 = 3/6 = 1/2.
In particular, as far as the proposition an apple is in the basket (the set {w 1 , w 3 }) is concerned, the outcome is: On the other hand, (iv) first applying linear pooling and then imaging leads to: as the group probability measure P has been determined already, it only remains to update P by imaging on the evidence, which yields P(apple in basket \\ banana not in basket [i.e., it was removed if there at all]) = 1/2, which coincides in value with the 1/2 that had been calculated in (iii) before. (Generalized) imaging and linear pooling commute:
Furthermore, the value of both of these expressions coincides with the original group probability P(apple in basket) = 1/2, and it does so for good reasons: after all, the apple's lying in the basket is causally independent of removing the banana, which is why the probability of the apple being in the basket should remain unaffected by the corresponding instance of imaging, and that is indeed the case.
Accordingly, our subjects S 1 and S 2 do not face a commutativity dilemma concerning group update with linear pooling in this kind of situation in which they learn about change (in the present case, change caused by an action), and in which their updates will be based on a shared set of relevant pieces of causal-statistical background knowledge. Whether 'group update' refers to (iii) or (iv) above simply does not matter, as the outcomes of the two strategies of group update are guaranteed to coincide.
Summary and Consequences
We started with the familiar observation that conditionalization or standard Bayesian update does not commute with the linear pooling of subjective probability measures. This led to a dilemma: How should a group of subjects update? The response to that dilemma that we were exploring in this paper was to replace conditionalization by an alternative updating scheme:
general imaging. We explained that method of update in some detail, we stated Gärdenfors' characterization result for it, and we derived from that result that general imaging was not subject to a similar kind of dilemma with respect to linear pooling as conditionalization was.
Afterwards we argued that in a situation in which a group of subjects is meant to learn about a changing world and in which their update captures a common set of relevant pieces of causalstatistical background knowledge, general imaging might actually constitute the right method of group learning. Therefore, by the previous finding, no variant of the original commutativity dilemma concerning group update with linear pooling is going to affect the right method of group update in these situations.
Various extensions of these findings come to mind. Most importantly, it should be possible to extend both the original dilemma and our way out of it to the case of group decision-making with linear pooling: e.g., assume two subjects trying to determine as a group the expected utility of carrying out an action E. Let us assume that the intended social utility measure is the function u. Finally, for simplicity, let us assume that their focus is just on two possible outcomes O 1 and O 2 that the relevant possible courses of action might have. By first individually supposing the proposition that E is carried out and then linearly pooling the resulting probability measures (assuming that linear pooling is their preferred method of aggregation again), they might determine
Alternatively, our two subjects might first linearly pool their individual probability measures and only then suppose E to be carried out, which gives an expected utility of the form
or more briefly, where P is the linear pool of P 1 and P 2 ,
The ensuing questions should be familiar by now: Will these two procedures lead to the same outcome? If not, how should these subjects determine expected utilities as a group: in the first manner or in the second one? Now we are facing a potential commutativity dilemma concerning group decision-making and linear pooling. Unsurprisingly, it should be possible to answer these questions and to reply to the potential dilemma in ways that should be familiar by now, and the answers and the reply will be sensitive to the mode of supposition again (matter of fact vs subjunctive). In particular, if causal decision theory formulated by means of generalized imagining were to be valid (at least in a certain type of situations), 20 and hence expressions of the form 'P(O if E)' were to be analyzed by means of general imaging, then group decision-making with linear pooling could be shown in the very same manner not to be affected by the corresponding commutativity dilemma. There would be, extensionally, a unique method for a group to determine socially expected utilities of actions by means of averaging. But we leave such applications to social (causal) decision theory to another paper. 21 
